Abstract-In 1990, Guillou and Quisquater published an article where they described a new digital signature system. Their technique was based on the RSA algorithm. In this paper, we present several modified GuillouQuisquater digital signature protocols. We discuss their security and complexity. These schemes can be seen as alternative signature methods if existing systems are completely broken.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its invention, the public key cryptography [3, 9, 8] offers many possibilities to share information in a safe way. As one of the most used subjects in this field, we have digital signature protocols. To sign a contract, Alice begins by publishing her public key in a secure server distribution. If she decides to sign a document, she must use her private key. Generally she has to solve a hard mathematical equation. The verifier Bob checks if the answer given by Alice is valid. Since only Alice knows the private key, it is impossible for anybody to imitate her signature.
The principle of the most known signatures schemes, relies on developing the solutions of hard problems, like discrete logarithm, factoring and computing square root modulo a large composite number [9, 5, 11, 10, 8, 7, 4, 2] . These algorithms are claimed to be secure by their authors. But it, perhaps one day they will be broken. Hence, the need of designing new alternatives.
In 1990, Guillou and Quisquater published a paper [5] where they exposed a remarkable digital signature system. Their technique was based on the RSA algorithm.
In this work, we present several new types of GuillouQuisquater signature scheme. We also analyze their security and complexity.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we recall the basic Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme and review the main known attacks. Then we present new variants in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to a summary table and we conclude in section 5.
In the sequel, we will respect Guillou-Quisquater paper notations [5] . N , Z are respectively the sets of integers and non-negative integers. We start by describing the classical Guillou-Quisquater signature method.
II. GUILLOU-QUISQUATER SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section we review Guillou-Quisquater signature system [5] . We also discuss the most known attacks.
The protocol needs three steps: generating parameters, signing message and verifying signature.
Guillou-Quisquater algorithm
Let h be a secure public hash function like SHA1 [6, chap.9] or [12, chap.5].
To generate the keys:
-Alice chooses randomly two large primes P and Q , then she calculates PQ n = .
-She takes an integer 0 < < ( ) vn  , where () n  is the phi-Euler function.
-She selects randomly an identification variable B (2) is valid for the variables t and T furnished by Alice. Now, we discuss the most known attacks.
Example
Let ( , , , J v n )=
Main attacks
In this subsection we present situations where the dishonest Oscar is able to forge Alice signature.
Attack 1: The first attack is indicated in the "handbook of applied cryptography" [6, chap.11] . In GuillouQuisquater system, the integer v must be sufficiently large. This choice excludes the possibility of forging Alice signature. We briefly describe this attack. 
He uses (4), (5) and (6) to prove (7) as follows:
So in this case, Oscar has forged Alice signature.
Hence the need of using a large value of the integer v .
We move to the second known attack. 
If Oscar finds an interesting message M where:
T , 2 t and 2 T , he proves illegally that Alice has signed the document M . Now, we propose new variants of Guillou-Quisquater signature.
III. OUR VARIANTS OF GUILLOU-QUISQUATER
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section we describe seven new variants of Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme. They are based on multiple hard problems.
The following parameters will be used throughout of this section:
 h is a secure public hash function like SHA1 [6, chap.9] 
where T t, are unknown variables.
To solve equation (9), Alice fixes arbitrary T to be v r T = mod n , where r is chosen randomly in 2,3,..., 2  n . Then she finds:
B mod n  (10) As Alice knows the secret key B , she computes the second unknown variable t by congruence (10) . Note that there are many couples ) , ( T t solutions of the relation (9).
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking if equation (9) is valid for the variables t and T furnished by Alice. Now, we study the security of this method.
Security analysis
Assume that Oscar is Alice's opponent. (1) Suppose that he fixes T , and likes to solve the modular congruence (9) . But here, he will face a modular polynomial equation. We don't know a method for solving that kind of problems.
(2) Suppose that he fixes t and wants to solve equation (9) . But here also we have a weird equation and today there is no way to find its solution.
Attack 3: Even if Bob gets the solutions t and T , he
is not able to find Alice secret key, because he must solve the equation (10) In fact, we use (4), (5) and (6), and we have:
Complexity of the algorithm
From subsection 3.1.1 , we see that the signer Alice needs to perform three modular exponentiations, one modular multiplication and one hash function computation. The global required time is:
The verifier Bob needs to perform two modular exponentiations, one modular multiplication and one hash function computation. The global required time is:
For all the following Guillou-Quisquater variants, the complexity is summarized in a table in section 4 . Now, we move to our second variant. 
Second Variant

Security analysis
This variant can be seen as more secured that the original Guillou-Quisquater signature. Indeed, solving (11) implies breaking congruence (2) .
Attack 1: Even if Bob gets the solutions t and T he
is not able to find Alice secret key, because he must solve the equation (12) with two unknowns B and r . (1) Suppose that he fixes T , and likes to solve the modular congruence (11) . But here, he will face a modular polynomial equation. We don't know a method for solving that kind of problems.
(2) Suppose that he fixes t and wants to solve equation (11) . But here we have a weird equation and today there is no way to find its solution. 
As Alice knows the secret key B , she computes the second unknown variable t by congruence (14).
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking if equation (13) is valid for the variables t and T furnished by Alice.
Security analysis
Attack 1: Even if Bob gets the solutions t and T he
is not able to find Alice secret key, because he must solve the equation (14) with two unknown parameters B and r .
Attack 2:
Oscar wants to imitate Alice signature for a contract M . He fixes arbitrary one unknown variable and tries to find the second parameter.
(1) Suppose that he fixes T , and likes to solve the modular congruence (13) . But here, he will face a modular polynomial equation. We don't know a method for solving that kind of problems.
(2) Suppose that he fixes t and wants to solve equation (13) . But here we have a weird equation and today there is no way to find its solution.
Attack 3:
This variant is resistant to the first attack mentioned in subsection 2.2 . Even with a small value of the exponent v Bob is not able to forge Alice signature.
In fact, we use (4), (5) (1) Suppose that he fixes T , and likes to solve the modular congruence (15). But here, he will face a square root modulo a large number. We don't know a method for solving that kind of problems.
Security analysis
(2) Suppose that he fixes t and wants to solve equation This system has the advantage that Oscar must solve two hard problems instead of one. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented seven protocols that can be useful if the old signature systems are completely broken. These variants are all derived from Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme. We analyzed the time complexity in signing and verifying algorithm. Also most possible attacks have been discussed.
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